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This paper examines the future of community and values for 2050 in three areas: likely 
trends, probable trends, and possible outcomes. It evaluates current and emergent 
patterns, in particular the overarching shifts toward a more individualised society; the 
use of digital technology as both enabler and inhibiter of participation in wider society; 
and the rise in socio-spatial inequalities and the empowering responses to those 
inequalities.  
 
In order to generate new insights and establish a wider understanding of the implications 
of and for communities and values out to 2050, our paper sets out a novel way of 
examining key trends and patterns through five stages. First, we introduce a matrix that 
enables us to identify examples of communities across their different states (i.e. 
formation, movement, preservation, dissolution) in relation to core characteristics of 
communities (i.e. access, place, power, security). Secondly, we use a wide range of 
different examples of communities to populate this matrix to illustrate the complex 
interrelationships of the different types, their values, and scale of influence. Thirdly, 
having examined these examples through business as usual scenarios, we then use a 
speculative mode to explore radical alternatives based on the evidence collected to 
understand the challenges, barriers, risks and threats that may face the future of 
communities and values out to 2050. These scenarios are described in order to explain 
the way events might unfold and in doing so, enable us to understand what guidance 
and actions may need to be followed to direct us toward a desirable future. Fourthly, we 
then use an analytical mode to examine evidence that enables assessment of the 
underlying changes informing risks and threats (i.e. who we are, what we will do, why we 
will do it). Finally, we compare these two modes to understand how the future of 





























As Ki-Moon (2014) has observed, one of the key issues facing governance and security 
of post-2015 development agenda is that “people across the world are looking … (for) a 
truly transformative agenda that is both universal and adaptable…. Their voices have 
underscored the need for democracy, rule of law, civic space and more effective 
governance and capable institutions…” Prior to examining the core subjects under 
investigation in this report, this section provides a short critical review of future studies, 
foresight and scenario methods, and their relevance in understanding and discussing 
the future of community and values. The uneven set of environmental, economic and 
political conditions across different territories also means that the methods and 
implications for foresight and understanding trends varies (UNDP, 2014). However, we 
present here a fresh perspective for understanding futures and enabling scenario 
formulation to examine possible alternatives.  
 
In particular, the main purpose of this section is to provide a rationale for the approach 
that we adopted for compiling this report. In this approach, trends and forecasts are not 
accepted as blueprints of what lies ahead (Dator, 2007), but as starting point for 
exploratory discussions aimed at highlighting possible and unlikely alternatives, how 
these might come to be, and what implications and frictions might they involve for the 
future of communities and values.    
 
1. Futures 
Firstly, it is important to understand how “futures” are conceptualised in the field of future 
studies. The way in which futures are looked at has in fact a defining influence on how 
futures are researched (and therefore on approaches and methods of future studies).  
The most radical shift in the way futures are understood took place when historical 
circumstances largely influenced by human agency (rather than divine plans) came to be 
acknowledged as the main factor shaping the way in which both individual and social 
futures may unfold (Robinson, 2003; Adam, 2010; Urry, 2016). At the same time, 
complexity theories developed from the 1970s demonstrated that that when dealing with 
social adaptive systems such as cities, communities, ecosystems, and so on, it is 
difficult, and often impossible, to predict the future outcomes of actions and decisions 
that are taken in the present (Lewin, 1999; Gell-Mann, 1995). From such theories, social 
sciences adopted the idea of futures as sets of emerging alternatives, rather than 
unfolding along linear pathways (Urry, 2016).  
 
Within this context, several authors have attempted to define futures and their 
characteristics. Many scholars have provided definitions and laws of the future informed 
by its uncertain and complex nature (see for example Amara 1981; Bell 2002; Rescher 
1998). The main characteristics of these definitions are summarised in Glenn’s list of 
commonly accepted philosophical assumptions about the future (2003): 
 
1. You cannot know the future, but a range of possible futures can be known;  
2. The likelihood of a future event or condition can be changed by policy, and policy 
consequences can be forecasted;  
3. Gradations of foreknowledge and probabilities can be made; we can be more 
certain about the sunrise than about the rise of the stock market;  
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4. No single method should be trusted; hence, cross referencing methods improves 
foresight;  
5. Humans will have more influence on the future than they did in the past. 
 
Unpredictability is the common feature of all definitions of the future. For this reason, 
most anticipatory approaches currently focus on the idea of “alternative futures”. 
Henchley (1978) identified four classes of futures: 
• Possible Futures: all the futures that we can imagine might happen, no matter 
how unlikely; 
• Plausible Futures: all the futures that could happen according to today’s current 
knowledge; 
• Probable Futures: the futures that we think are more likely to happen, based on 
our understanding of how current trends could continue; 
• Preferable Futures: the futures that one would like to happen. 
 
To this list, Voros (2003) adds:  
• Potential Futures: all of the alternative futures, including those that are beyond the 
power of imagination. 
 
As a way of visualising the complexity of understanding the future, this way of classifying 
the future shows that outcomes that appear to be unfathomable are worth of being 
discussed, if there is an even remote possibility of them becoming reality. 
While being problematic in their deterministic assumptions (as it will be discussed in the 
following section), these categories are indicative of the probabilistic (Robinson, 2003) 
approach that guided the development of a dedicated field of research: the 
transdisciplinary field of future studies. 
 
3. Futures studies 
Futures Studies can be defined as the discourse concerned with the systematic and 
semi-structured examination of future potentials and possibilities (Spies, 1982; Schwartz, 
1996; Sardar, 2010) through the use of scientific methods and processes (Son 2015).  
The field of future studies emerged with the intention of developing tools and techniques 
for supporting the setting of long-term strategies, and guide decision-making by creating 
probabilistic models of possible futures. Crucially, many scholars have argued that future 
studies is not concerned with predicting “the future” as a single entity (Sardar, 2010), but 
with challenging plans and expectations through “what if” questions that are formulated 
in the form of scenarios (Slaughter, 2002; Schwartz, 1996). Both foresight and scenario 
methodologies have been widely adopted for grounding discussions on future strategies 
and decision-making, both in corporate and institutional settings. But while scenario-
based discussions can result in the development of strategies that are flexible enough to 
respond to unexpected future developments (Schwartz, 1996), some authors warn us 
against the shortcomings of foresight methods. 
 
Foresight is the strategic forward-looking analysis of socio-technical systems conducted 
for the purpose of identifying promising areas of research and development to plan 
investments (Son, 2015). It is a much used technique by companies and institutions, but 
criticised in the field of futures studies because it fails to make the standpoint of the 
research explicit and therefore is limited in capturing diversity and alternatives. It also 
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typically identifies futures that are preferable to the institution that commissioned the 
study. Sardar detects a tension between the way in which futures studies have been 
formulated (see the laws cited earlier for example) and the “intrinsically singular” nature 
of foresight methods that are employed for decision-making. Foresight is, for Sardar 
(2010), business-like and product-oriented. For this reason, and because of the wide 
range of possible futures that they can represent, scenarios are considered a more 
suitable method for considering a wider range of futures. Scenarios are plausible, 
challenging and relevant stories about how the future might unfold (Hunt et al., 2012), 
developed to inform strategies or to guide interventions (Börjeson et al., 2006). As a tool, 
they have been adopted by government think-tanks, business strategists, and by 
research institutes investigating global challenges. Unlike the futures emerging from 
foresight techniques, scenarios usually describe ranges of distinct futures, presented as 
easy-to-understand narratives leading to further discussions. 
 
Adopting scenarios as a starting, rather than end point for strategic discussions, is a way 
of dealing with the uncertain and subjective nature of futures. Dator (2007) points out 
that while “the future” cannot be predicted (due to its uncertainty), “alternative futures” 
can and should be forecasted, analysed and discussed. These discussions should 
include “ridiculous” and unexpected ideas: “Because new technologies permit new 
behaviours and values, challenging old beliefs and values which are based on prior 
technologies, much that will be characteristic of the futures is initially novel and 
challenging. It typically seems at first obscene, impossible, stupid, "science fiction", 
ridiculous. And then it becomes familiar and eventually "normal"” (Dator, 2007). 
Furthermore, as experiences and images of the past and the present shape the way in 
which futures are conceptualised (Sardar, 2010; Gonzatto, 2013), introducing scenarios 
as sites of discussions can also help with clarifying agendas, expectations, underlying 
values, and assumptions. Such assumptions refer both to what is considered preferable, 
but also what is probable, possible, or plausible since probabilistic models of futures are 
largely influenced by the tools and practices that generated them (Dator, 2007). 
 
Finally, just like presents and pasts, futures will be evenly distributed. Probable, 
possible, plausible, and potential futures will coexist and will look very different to 
different communities and individuals (List, 2005; van der Heijden, 2005; Savransky and 
Rosengarten, 2017). This multiplicity of futures can be captured in scenarios that are 
structured in ways that makes it possible to open discussions that both include and 
consider heterogeneous groups of actors and contexts. 
 
5. Understanding the future of communities and values 
This section has so far described futures as complex, heterogeneous, and unfolding 
through non-linear trajectories. It has suggested the existence of the paradox of needing 
to understand the possible consequence of decisions and actions while not being 
entirely able to predict what the future might look like. As a method, scenarios can assist 
us in capturing the complexity of the future, while enabling us to explore and understand 
a variety of possibilities. One of the roles that scenario-making activities can play is to 
enhance structured discussions. In such discussions values and expectations are made 
explicit and can be questioned, and the impacts and implications of each scenarios on 
different community can be explored. This report will reflect on the future of communities 
and values in the context of nine global challenges to society. Rather than relying on 
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trend analysis and foresight techniques for providing a forecast of the way in which 
different communities around the world might react to such challenges, we will suggest a 
framework for storytelling and world building.  
 
The framework considers four states of communities (‘formation’, ‘movement’, 
‘preservation’, ‘dissolution/change’) with four core characteristics of them (‘access’, 
‘place’, ‘power’, ‘security’). These states are characteristics will be used as narrative 
guidance for describing the future scenarios related to each societal challenge. The 
framework will be fully described in the next section. For each challenge we will initially 
present one possible “business as usual” (GSG, 1995) scenario. As part of this study, 
we intend to conduct a workshop in which participants will be asked to explore 
alternative scenarios, by building variations of the story presented in this report, and/or 
considering different communities. In this sense, this report is to be intended primarily as 
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Structure and themes 
 
This report examines the key 'states' of community i.e.: their formation, movement, 
preservation, and dissolution. For the context of this work, values are understood to be 
intrinsic to any community so this enables the states to also be explored through how 
and why values contribute to the building of a community, how and why a community 
and/or its values may travel, how and why values of a community are preserved, and, 
where applicable, how and why values and/or a community perishes. 
 
To aid the understanding of these states, we then explore them in relation to four core 
characteristics: access, place, power, and security. For the purposes of this report, a 
definition for each of these themes follows.  
 
• Access in this context is understood as the ways in which a community admits its 
constituents and their interactions within it.  
• Place here is defined as the contextual boundaries of the community's operation, 
geographic or otherwise. 
• Power refers to the organisation of the community, whether explicit or implicit, 
and any attendant notions of structure, hierarchy, management, and protocol. 
• Security is understood here as the ways in which a community controls itself and 
protects its values from others where risk or threats are perceived or identified. 
 
In order to illustrate emergent and established trends and patterns across different 
states of community and these core characteristics, we use nine issues to enable the 
breadth and depth of the future of community and values out to 2050 to be assiduously 
connected to the evidence gathered for this report. These nine issues have been initially 
identified using meta-analysis of global trends and futures thinking and are as follows: 
 
1. Climate change 
2. Food and water security 








We acknowledge the matrix generated for this work is our design and is deliberately 
flexible and not absolute. This directly correlates to the considerable difficulty of defining 
both 'community' and 'value' in an increasingly complex, fluid, interconnected, and 
rapidly changing world. As such, we use the nine different themes as a vehicle to 
unpack different types, scales and values of communities. This provides a dual function. 
Firstly, it enables us to inhabit the matrix so that we are able to communicate the ways in 
which communities are created, evolve, transfer and sometimes perish. Secondly, it also 
affords us the opportunity to construct plausible scenarios based on probable 
developments whereby the world largely continues 'business as usual'. The advantage 
of these functions is that it supports critical evaluation and speculation of radical 
alternatives in relation to what we might understand as being a conventional future i.e. a 
comparatively steady continuation of the various communities and values we currently 
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identify around the globe. Through this synthesis, the construction of three potential 
future worlds: conventional, barbarous, and great transition, provides a platform across 
which we are able to identify signifiers as to how and why events may unfold in the 
future and therefore have a greater understanding of what actions may be necessary to 









































Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s (DCDC) Global Strategic Trends Programme 
 
 11 
The four states 
 
In this section we introduce the four states of community across which different groups 
that share or have certain attitudes and values in common may experience depending 
on the nature, context and conditions affecting them. Communities exist for different 
lifespans and various scales. We therefore examine how they are formed, move, 
preserved or dissolve depending on their features and contexts.  
 
1. Community Formation 
The first state of a community is its creation. How and why a specific community comes 
into being can be for a number of different, sometimes intersecting, purposes. 
Communities may be typically focused around a particular interest, practice or socio-
spatial context. Clearly different communities form for different reasons but there has to 
be a shared value or set of values by its members for it to be defined as such. 
 
2. Community Movement  
Communities are not necessarily static or fixed geographically. Importantly, they may be 
poly-nucleic or have a number of constituent groups that are connected. In this manner, 
the values of a community may be dispersed across a network that connects multiple 
locations. A community may move physically, i.e. the geographic mobilisation of its 
members to another location, or its values may be transferred to a separate context. The 
latter situation may result in stability, increase or decrease of the community's size and 
influence. 
 
3. Community Preservation 
One of the most important ways in which a community defines itself is through the 
shared values of its members. Of course, such values are not necessarily supported or 
shared by others outside of a specific community. This renders many communities with 
the need to protect or sustain certain values intrinsic to their group indeed it may lead to 
their initial formation. Preservation of values through a community raises important 
issues since the promotion or maintenance of particular attitudes and values usually 
correlated with the implicit or explicit occlusion or disavowal of others. 
 
4. Community Dissolution 
Communities may exist for different lifespans or across various timeframes. A 
community's purpose may be around a specific issue that once addressed leads to the 
dispersal of that group. Other communities may be broken up through violence and or 
opposition, degenerate through fragmentation, or lose momentum through inertia. The 
strength or fragility of a community relates to its members' ability to sustain its values 
against competing interests or serious threats to it.  
 
Core Characteristics 
To provide a better understanding of these states, they are illustrated in relation to four 
core characteristics: access, place, power, and security. Access in this context is 
understood as the ways in which a community admits its constituents and their 
interactions within it. Place here is defined as the contextual boundaries of the 
community's operation, geographic or otherwise. Power refers to the organisation of the 
community, whether explicit or implicit, and any attendant notions of structure, hierarchy, 
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management, and protocol. Security is understood here as the ways in which a 
community controls itself and protects its values from others where risk or threats are 
perceived or identified. Through illustrating how these core characteristics of 
communities relate to the different potential states using specific examples, we aim to 
demonstrate the connections in future-oriented thinking about communities and values 
and provide a synthesis of the detected key trends and patterns. These are then brought 
together through three future world scenarios to afford more nuanced understanding of 
how events might unfold and in doing so, allow us to speculate what guidance and 
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Challenges to society  
 
This section provides the context for community and values in relation to wider issues 
facing society within a multi-disciplinary discourse, along with any relevant definitions 
used. Drawing from a wide array of futures-orientated literature, we have selected nine 
pertinent themes across which we will describe a range of futures that may shape and 
affect communities and values out to 2050. Each of these nine themes will subsequently 
be unpacked in relation to the different states of community (i.e. formation, movement, 
preservation, dissolution) and explore how these relate, in multi-various ways, to four 
core characteristics of communities (i.e. access, place, power, security). In doing so, we 
aim to be able to illustrate the complexity and diversity of interrelationships between 
communities and values. Through the synthesis of these themes we then examine the 
three future worlds to identify potential trajectories concerning the challenges, barriers, 
risks and threats that may face the future of communities and values out to 2050. 
 
1. Climate Change 
Perhaps the single most significant challenge to humanity is climate change. The effects 
of climate change are predicted to have long-term implications for the global population, 
with a wide range of consequences differing from location to location but are likely to 
include: drought, flooding, higher temperatures, more frequent and extreme weather 
events, and shifting seasons. 
 
2. Food and water security 
By 2050, the world's population is projected to have grown to around 9 billion. The 
majority of the these people are expected to live developing countries and have higher 
incomes than is currently the case which directly correlates with an increased demand 
for food and potable water. The IFRI's policy report, Climate Change: Impact on 
Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation, used climate modelling expertise to analyse crop 
growth under two simulated future climate scenarios. Gappolin (2012) illustrates the key 
drivers and causal links affecting water stress and sustainability and human wellbeing 
through five scenarios to draw out various future trajectories. 
 
3. Health and wellbeing 
The environment is critical in forming and understanding communities and their values. 
For example, places may provide safety and secure access to a range of resources 
essential to human life and thus important for health and wellbeing. The implications of 
changing communities and values for the  
 
4. Urbanisation 
Increased urbanisation around the world and general trends of migration toward cities 
indicate they will have an important role in the future. In terms of challenges to society, 
cities provide the primary context within with many different agglomerations of issues 
come together. Cities are often the underlying nexus across which various communities 
establish, assert, contest and reconfigure their values. They are necessarily places of 
complexity, with multiple interactions and significant diversity of communities typically 
being key features of them. Although a global phenomenon, the process of urbanisation 
performs differently in terms of the scale, speed and resulting built environment 
depending on the geographic context. Urbanisation has a symbiotic relationship with 
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those areas that are rural or not urban since its processes require material resources, 
labour, energy and food production that are typically drawn from this wider context, if not 
across various national and international borders. 
 
5. Work 
Fundamental tenets that may inform communities and their values are related to how 
they live, their work and its patterns, and housing conditions. How people live, where 
they work and which type of accommodation they inhabit, if any, are important drivers to 
the relationships they form as part of communities of proximity i.e. those communities 
that are primarily a result of physical locations and the routines and behaviours that 
occur within them. In terms of work, the future of the nature of work appears to be 
precarious for a growing number of people. The rise of zero-hour contracts, the gig 
economy, and other temporary or even precarious forms of work means that the 
previously held routines related to places of work, regular shift patterns, and 
comparatively stable workforces are being eroded.  
 
6. Housing 
With regard housing, in the UK the pressure to provide affordable housing continues as 
market forces and investment shape patterns of tenure, purchase and dispossession. 
The widespread growth of 'individual collectivism' (Bernheimer, 2014), wherein young 
people are either deferring or declining family formation is leading to significant changes 
in the demands of housing and living patterns more broadly. There are several key 
shifts: mega/micro commuting patterns, the decrease in dormitory suburbs, and 
reformulation of housing ladders. Commuting patterns have evolved to relative extremes 
with either extensive or minimal travel to places of work. This has led to people 
commuting longer distances but also working from home or other proximate places more 
frequently. In correlation with the latter, the blurring or living and working spaces has 
meant the decline in dormitory suburbs. The shrinking of dedicated space per person in 
offices has been parallel to a growth in space per person in the dwelling, reflecting to 
some extent the shift of work activity into the home. What is less clear at present is how 
these two dominant patterns will influence and reshape housing ladders. Housing need 
is typically discussed at the national level, yet housing markets are more deeply defined 
by the local context of supply and demand.  
 
7. Identity 
Identity in the UK and elsewhere is changing. Out to 2050, the transformations to 
people's identities are likely to be significant, affected by key drivers of change 
especially the rapid pace of technological developments. The emergence of hyper-
connectivity, widespread growth of social media, and the increase in online personal 
information are key factors which will influence identities which in turn shapes the type of 
communities that will form and how and why they will develop. In 2013, Foresight Future 
Identities identified three significant findings for the future of identity: hyper-connectivity; 
increasing social plurality; and the blurring of public and private identities. The first of 
these indicates that developments in social and technological environments will combine 
to exert significant influence on people's identity. Greater social plurality or heterogeneity 
in UK society is reducing the norms to which people conform in their behaviour or views 
whilst their world-views typically become more diverse. Attitudes toward privacy are also 
shifting, with people increasingly willing to place personal information into public 
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domains, for example via social media, which is creating a convergence between 
formerly private and public identities. 
 
8. Diversity 
Closely related to and, to some extent, bound up in various notions of identity in the 
wider context is the theme of diversity. The increasing diversity of the UK's population 
means that dual ethnic and national identities will continue to become more common, 
while the gradual trends toward a more secular society seem very likely to continue over 
the next few decades. Of course, this outlook belies the various challenges that may 
arise as a result of radically different viewpoints and beliefs, which with increasing 
diversity of population may result in competing issues within communities and witness 
the emergence of radically alternative values outside of mainstream society.  
 
9. Migration 
The movement of people for various reasons including climate change, conflict, political 
unrest, and disasters is expected to continue. Climate change is expected to prompt 
growing population movements within and across borders, as a result of extreme 
weather events, sea-level rise and acceleration of environmental degradation. 
Furthermore, climate change will have adverse consequences for livelihoods, public 
health, food security, and water availability. This in turn will impact on human mobility, 
likely leading to a substantial rise in the scale of migration and displacement. These key 
drivers for movement of people will also be supplemented by those looking for better 
prospects across a spectrum of issues including but not limited to: employment 
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Example 1: Food and water security in relation to community 
formation 
 
Meeting the demands for safe food and water necessary to sustain 9 billion people (the 
size of global population expected by the middle of the century) is one of the most 
pressing challenges of our time. If business stays as usual, the increase in population 
and the expected increase in overall wealth will bring about a significant increase in the 
overall demand of processed food, meat, fish, and dairy that will add an enormous 
pressure on the food production system. The situation will be exacerbated by the threats 
of climate change and the growing competition for resources (Godfray et al., 2010). It 
follows that a major shift in food production and consumption paradigms is needed if the 
goal is to ensure food and water security at a global scale (Davis et al., 2016). To 
address this challenge, the “Western diet” will be forced to radically change. But, as food 
is related to many more factors than the simple consumption of calories for producing 
energy, a significant change in eating habits can only emerge from a change in value 
systems.  
 
The scenario described in this section presents a situation in which National 
Governments react to the looming scarcity of resources by changing food cultures 
through exerting direct control on what children in the education system eat. This 
constitutes not only a short-term systemic response to an immediate crisis, but also, and 
most significantly, a long-term strategy of reshaping values and redirecting practices. It 
is in fact proven that children eating habits are directly related to eating habits in 
adulthood (Mikkila et al., 2004), and that familiarising children with new foods and 
flavours through sensory education can increase the variety in their diet later on 
(Mustonen and Tuorila, 2010; Sandell et al., 2016).  
 
In relation to access, children in school systems will be the first to experience new, 
enhanced, resource-efficient foodstuff. Innovation will interest the producers of both 
crops and processed food. The latter will be increasingly entirely man-made, and will 
make wide use of lab-grown proteins, flavoured fungi, and synthetic supplements. Once 
these new flavours and shapes are accepted as the norm by school-kids, they will start 
to get adopted in family meals. The relationship to place will be defined as new practices 
of eating will be diffused initially in school canteens, which will become sites of food and 
sensorial education. Once the acceptability of new foodstuff is assessed, and new eating 
practices are established in school, new products and packaging will be distributed more 
widely, starting with targeting the ready-meal sector, traditionally more prone to innovate. 
Vending machines, take-away shops, and corner stores will be at the forefront of 
innovation. The power of multinational corporations such as McCain and Monsanto will 
extend the control that they have come to exercise on the current agricultural system to 
new seeds and crops. Large consumer good corporations that include food divisions 
(e.g. Unilever, Procter and Gamble etc.) will extend their control to new synthetic 
substances and foodstuff. The private sector will then work in partnership with national 
governmental organisation and international bodies to develop educational and food-
adaptation programmes developed for schools. Issues concerning security will, in this 
example, be focused upon a sensory education programme (Mustonen and Tuorila, 
2010) will be implemented as a soft form of indirect control. These programmes will be 
closely monitored, so that global diet and new foodstuff will co-evolve in time. 
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Example 2: Migration in relation to community movement 
 
In this second example, we examine the challenge of migration in relation to community 
movement and the four core characteristics. In terms of access, as countries around the 
world lurch politically to the right in the midst of rising nationalist sentiments, policies are 
being drafted that more vehemently restrict who can migrate to their lands. Migrant 
communities with capital, promise and the ‘right’ nationality will be allowed to enter; 
those without money, the relevant skills or who come from countries on watch lists will 
receive travel bans, regardless of their situation. With regard place and boundaries, 
migrants from Africa and the Middle East, wishing to enter Western European countries, 
continue to be placed in migrant centres or camps, like in Calais, which are poorly 
planned and prone to hazards. The camps often do not have proper sanitation and 
waste facilities, creating environmental waste and opportunities for airborne pathogens 
to spread among the migrant communities forced to live there until they are moved on. 
 
Power and organisation in relation to migration is a complex interrelationship between 
basic human needs and the various competing forces seeking to provide them across a 
public-private axis. The power within companies that typically profit from natural or 
human-made disasters, such as during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans, are turning to ‘migrant capitalism’ to make a quick buck. Through the increasing 
privatisation of ‘migrant care’ as a way of easing the burden faced by aid organisations, 
multinational companies are creating agile teams to visit immigrants all over the world to 
ply their brand of help, which usually involves paying lots of money for little, effective 
assistance. The security and control issues coalescing around migration issues are 
increasingly prominent as their impact upon other global challenges becomes further 
apparent. With border security between countries becoming tighter, more and more 
specific migrant communities (e.g., Mexican men and women in the US) have to 
maintain a precarious, bi-national lifestyle: migrants must go back to their home 
countries throughout the year and hope that policies, legislation and the moods of border 
control guards do not change in ways that will negatively affect their potential to earn 
money, have a better quality of life and move relatively freely. 
 
 
Example 3: Identity in relation to community preservation 
An important aspect of identity within a community is the sense of belonging. In order for 
a community to flourish, there is typically a set of shared values through which 
agreement is founded and bonding is developed. For the continuation of a community 
and its interests and/or practices, there is nearly always an element of preservation. This 
characteristic ensures that the community and its constituents' original purpose within it 
both endure. However, whilst there are benefits to the preservation of values and their 
respective communities there can also be significant disadvantages. Preservation may 
result in certain communities being viewed as outmoded and questioned or challenged 
through competing communities with alternative values. The promotion and sustaining of 
a value set also means that other values are deliberately excluded or hidden which may 
directly shape the size and accessibility into a particular community. The preservation of 
identity in an increasingly fluid and rapidly changing world can be challenging. Although 
the blurring of private and public identities on the one hand encourages convergence, 
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the prevalence of digital technologies may also result in membership of many different 
communities, unbounded by geography, and as such there may be numerous identities 
of an individual. The EU Referendum result of 24 June 2016 reflected the conflicting 
opinions and attitudes toward identity in the UK. Although the campaigns for either 
leaving or remaining in the European Union were based on a series of issues, a core 
argument to both sides was related to identity and notions of 'Britishness'. Central to 
either side's position on this was the respective pros and cons of immigration, closely 
bound up in the diversity of the nation. 
In relation to access and interactions within a community, identities influence people's 
behaviour, though they are not necessarily predictable, especially at the level of the 
individual (Foresight Future Identities, 2013). The role of online communities and identity 
within them has enabled like-minded individuals and groups to form collectives in order 
to sustain preserve their values. However, not everyone has access to digital 
technologies to facilitate these interactions resulting in disparity between those 
communities who are enabled to flourish and maintain their values on the one hand, and 
those who are unable to preserve their identities on the other. Significant socio-
economic deprivation may lead to exclusion and isolation, meaning that certain values 
are not promoted and ultimately unpreserved. People have strong attachments to 
places, which become integral to their identity and, importantly in this context, are 
strongly connected to their sense of belonging and security (Fresque-Baxter and 
Armitage, 2012). Despite the increase of globalisation and typically mobilised and 
urbanised societies, this relationship with place is no less significant (Adger, 2011). The 
connection between identities and place is potentially important for the preservation of 
community values and citizenship. Changes to the built environment can therefore be 
anticipated to have direct impacts, both positive and negative, on place identities. 
Therefore, the problems within deprived areas can also be understood to impact upon 
identity. Communities seek to preserve their values amidst the broader environment and 
circumstances in which they live. This may lead to segregation either undertaken to 
preserve 'safe' areas or, indeed, to exclude those deemed undesirable. Gated 
communities are perhaps the most obvious physical manifestation of this preservation 
within the built environment. Although not a new phenomenon, they are strong indicators 
of increased and growing social inequality. Whilst they may preserve the values of a 
particular community, this is potentially at the expense of wider social exclusion. 
The relationship between the power and organisation of a community and identity is 
typically understood through how we share, cooperate and form connections in the first 
instance. One of the key issues here, and indeed of political drivers more widely 
connected to identity, concerns trust. In the UK and elsewhere there has been a long-
term trend of declining trust in figures of authority (Duffy et al., 2005). This situation has 
received considerable attention recently due to the burgeoning of communities via social 
media and the rise of 'fake news'. The ability on online communities to organise and 
influence others based on shared values and interests coupled with a growing mistrust 
in mainstream media is enabling certain communities to preserve their identities through 
strong and active presence through various social media channels and blogs. Whilst this 
is facilitating an apparent shift of power from traditional bodies, it is less clear to what 
degree this move is actually occurring or is illusory due to the way echo chambers of 
opinion function (Lotan, 2016). The security and control surrounding the preservation of 
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identity online is primarily based on the original ethos behind the internet and the widely 
held view that users typically do not read website terms and conditions or privacy 
statements before accepting them (Harper, 2014). The prevalence of personal and 
collective data has led to the internet becoming a valuable resource for crime including: 
identity theft, fraud, and facilitating terrorism (Cabinet Office, 2011). At a community and 
individual level, identity theft may enable a range of criminal purposes by exploiting 
existing trust in their identity and social capital to deceive others or, conversely, to bring 
them into disrepute. Security of access and the interactions within a community, 
especially when conducted using technologies that may bypass face-to-face verification, 
is paramount. As the distinction between online and offline identities decreases, 
criminals are likely to seek new ways of exploiting interlinked data and thereby use 
reputations for blackmail extortion or simply destroy them. The importance of various 
detection and prevention strategies to address the evolution of identity-related security 
risks will be increasing critical (Anderson et al., 2012). 
 
 
Example 4: Health and wellbeing in relation to community dissolution 
 
How and why a community dissipates may be for a number of reason connected to its 
original purpose, lack of motivation between its constituents, being supplanted by a 
more dominant community or, at the extreme, being violently dispersed or rendered 
redundant. In term of access and interactions and in an effort to save public funding, 
access to the NHS in the UK has been changing over the past 10 years to include more 
virtual opportunities to see GPs and doctors, such as through Skype consultations. 
While promoting these options, NHS funding to some rural hospitals has declined to the 
point where they have to consider closing, thus removing a vital lifeline to communities 
living in rural areas who do not have good WiFi connections. Relationship to place and 
boundaries of health and wellbeing are increasingly blurred due to contemporary 
lifestyles, processes of globalisation and aspirations for those in poverty to be able to 
access better living standards. In both developing and developed countries, the shift in 
prevalence from communicable to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) over the last 70 
years has meant that communities of medical practice have had to change, often 
breaking up and reforming in new ways to combat NCDs, such as cardiovascular 
disease, cancer and diabetes. Focus also has shifted to the prevention of NCD risk 
factors, including tobacco and alcohol use, which may involve new forms of campaigning 
that are found in both physical (e.g., billboards about eating fresh fruit and veg in 
neighbourhoods considered to be ‘food deserts’) and virtual (e.g., viral social media 
campaign about checking lumps on bodies) places. 
 
The power and organisation behind many of the issues pertaining to health and 
wellbeing lie within the private sector. Large pharmaceutical companies have been 
partnering with – or buying up – companies in the agricultural industry, often 
restructuring these once specialist markets and undercutting how they do business. As a 
result, many people in traditional farming communities are being put out of business, as 
they are getting less money for their yields, and efficiency and profit is being 
championed above healthy, organically-grown, quality crops. In terms of the security and 
control of provision and distribution, as a result of taking greater control over the 
agricultural industry, large pharmaceutical companies are beginning to influence what 
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citizens eat. Through large kickbacks to physicians and educational facilities, the tight-
knit community of school nutritionists are being called into question, as their advice is 
not needed, especially when they disagree with big pharma. Instead, companies are 
thinking of installing their own ‘lifestyle nutritionists’ in schools who can toe the party line 
and effectively sell their products to children. 
 
 
Example 5: Work in relation to access and interactions of a 
community 
 
This example is informed by the recent proliferation of new market-mediated alternative 
modes of use, acquisition, and access to services and work force. Bardhi and Eckhart 
define access-based consumption as “transactions that may be market mediated in 
which no transfer of ownership takes place. The consumer is acquiring consumption 
time with the item, and, in market-mediated cases of access, is willing to pay a price 
premium for use of that object” (2012, 881).  Botsman and Rogers (2011) have noted in 
recent years a renaissance of models of collaborative consumption, similar to access-
based consumption, but with an emphasis on the relation between users, related in 
particular to three main areas of sharing: product-service systems; redistribution 
markets; collaborative lifestyles. In particular, academic, popular, and trade-specific 
literatures have focussed on the sharing economy: a particular type of collaborative 
consumption in which dedicated platforms enable users to share idle assets (Wosskow, 
2014; Botsman, 2013). These platforms play an essential role in new models of sharing 
economy, by creating “markets in sharing” that facilitate the exchange of goods, services 
and “productive assets” (i.e. assets that enable production, such as tools, information, 
spaces) (Schor, 2014). The high rates of adoption of the most popular examples of 
sharing economy (e.g. AirBnB, Lyft, TaskRabbit), and the positive connotations 
attributed in popular media to the phenomenon, had a spill over effect promoting other 
models of access-based use and consumption, beyond the sharing economy (Meelen 
and Frenken, 2015; Yaranghi and Ravi, 2017). In Europe PwC showed how sharing 
economy models are influencing wider consumer behaviour, in particular with on-
demand ride-sharing changing the way in which we travel (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 
2016).  
 
As models of access-based and collaborative consumption growth from niche to 
mainstream, access-based forms of work part of the so-called the “gig economy” have 
become more prominent. The UK Chartered Institute for Personnel Development (CIPD) 
defines the gig economy as “a way of working that is based on people having temporary 
jobs or doing separate pieces of work, each paid separately, rather than working for an 
employer” (CIPD, 2017). While according to a recent CIPD survey (2017) “gigging” is not 
yet the main source of income for most UK workers (but is usually complementing a 
main job), evidence suggest that the situation might be changing in the future. 
PwC, who has been studying the phenomenon for the last few years, argues that the 
fastest growing sector of the sharing economy (+50%) will be the gig economy, and 
particularly Peer-to-peer on-demand household services, “freelance marketplaces 
enabling households to access on-demand support with household tasks such as food 
delivery or DIY”. In 2025 this will be the second biggest sector overall, behind peer-to-
peer transport (1st overall) and above Peer-to-peer accommodation (3rd overall). 
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In this paper we chose to look at access-based work at a national scale. However, while 
Europe and North America have so far been leaders in the collaborative economy, the 
phenomenon has a worldwide significance (Yaranghi and Ravi, 2017; McLaren and 
Agyeman, 2015). 
 
Considering the formation of communities for work in this example, throughout the last 
century, big manufacturers have displaced their production and distribution systems and 
shifted from a national to a multinational scale. In the future, this displacement will 
interest the global and national scale alike. As companies turn to digital platforms to 
optimise their operations, online environments will replace traditional offices. 
Furthermore, IoT and 3D printing will promote networked systems of production and use 
of hybrid digital and physical goods and services. It therefore seems possible, in this 
highly networked infrastructure both for specialised and non-specialised workers to 
collaborate with different employers, a large portion of the workforce will consist of 
freelance “gig economy” workers. The movement of such communities will necessarily 
become further mobile. With the gig economy entering traditional sectors (services and 
manufacturing), the workforce will be displaced: from traditional offices to co-working 
spaces. Some of these spaces will be equipped with manufacturing pods sponsored by 
different companies. In this highly networked hybrid system, vicinity to a corporate office 
will no longer be essential for most people. However, the quality of co-working spaces, 
and the type of “gigs” that are accessible in different cities or neighbourhood will vary, 
with better opportunities for career growth located in particular areas of few cities.  
 
With regard the preservation of working communities, technology is likely to be the 
primary driver of change. Algorithms will be the main form of control of the efficiency, 
conduct, and performance of each worker. The algorithm measures and rewards 
positive behaviours, thus eliminating discriminatory practices that might hinder career 
progression. At the same time, however, the algorithm leaves no room for empathy 
between employee and employer, as it eliminates personal relationships within the 
company chain of management entirely. This means that while workers are in principle 
free to manage their commitments and portfolio, failures to meet the expectations as 
calculated by the system, may result in poor feedback results and penalties. These 
might accumulate over time with a ‘snowballing’ effect. A key concern that may influence 
the dissolution or reformulation of communities of work is the different forms of 
discrimination embedded in many sharing economy services. This is both about 
personal bias, but also (although there is scant evidence to prove it), embedded in the 
algorithm. This will continue in a system in which the gig economy is the main mode of 
employment, with dramatic consequences for vulnerable groups. In addition, the over-
reliance on personal means and resources will dramatically increase discrimination 
based on wealth. 
  
 
Example 6: Climate change in relation to place and boundaries of a 
community 
 
Among all the challenges considered in this report, climate change is arguably the most 
critical one. The effects of climate change are in fact bound to directly or indirectly 
influence the development of every other issue that is taken into consideration. The most 
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recent report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that 
based on direct observation and longitudinal monitoring, “[w]arming of the climate 
system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are 
unprecedented over decades to millennia” (IPCC, 2014). While long-term predictions 
based on experiments and studies carry with them a significant degree of uncertainty, 
experts agree that if greenhouse emissions are not radically reduced in a sustained way, 
further warming and changes in all components of the climate system are virtually 
certain to occur (Collins et al., 2013). However, it is now clear that even if CO2 were to 
be stopped, the effects of climate change will persist for a long time. The consequences 
of a rise in temperature will not be the same in different regions. For example, while 
some areas will experience drought, others will be affected by more copious rainfall. The 
2013 IPCC report includes detailed information on the expected patterns in different 
regions and ecosystems (IPCC, 2013). But unlike in the past few years, when 
anthropogenic extreme phenomena and natural disasters were mostly concentrated in 
particular areas and happened as individual episodes, in the future the effects of climate 
change will be felt at a global scale. Episodes of droughts, flooding, will be common and 
expected also in areas that would have been traditionally considered safer. In this 
sense, climate change has therefore been recognised to be also a social and political 
issue as well as a scientific and economic one (Urry, 2011). As such, it will impact the 
life, organisation, and values of communities. 
 
This example illustrates how the place of a community affected by frequent flooding 
might move through the four states. In terms of formation, the last century has seen an 
increase in individualistic and consumerist values and behaviours, in which private 
property and self-reliance are prioritised (Ivanova, 2011). However, after a number of 
flooding episodes causing increasingly disruptive of built environment and 
infrastructures, people leaving in affected areas start to come together as communities 
with the practical purpose of dealing with damage and disruptions. As flooding becomes 
a more frequent occurrence, such communities organise themselves and put pressure 
on local councils and governments to implement better preventive and response 
measures. In terms of community movement, some individuals might be forced or 
enticed to be relocate, to less affected areas. The choice of where to move is often 
informed by research and media reports on the causes and localised effects of climate 
change. People might also value community cohesion and engagement in the new place 
where they move. The preservation of the community in this instance may be difficult. 
NGOs and special interest groups become increasingly crucial, for their efforts to 
monitor and support change and implementing preservation measures. They will be 
more visible in the community and become the fulcrum of networks of citizens and local 
authorities. However, some individuals with resources might decide to isolate 
themselves, and advocate against policies and interventions that are intended to benefit 
the community as a whole, but might be perceived as disadvantageous for the 
individual. This example illustrates how the dissolution process of a community may 
begin, as wealthier people decide to sell their property and move to places that are not 
yet dramatically affected by flooding, some communities will suffer from the 
consequences of having fewer services, lower resources, and empty properties. Such 
communities will be fragmented, impoverished, and will show lower levels of wellbeing. 
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Example 7: Housing in relation to power and organisation of a 
community 
 
In order to provide focus to the challenge of housing, in this example we examine the 
nature of co-housing. Co-housing is defined as housing with common spaces and 
shared facilities (Vestbro, 2010). For the purposes of this report, the different models of 
housing, including collaborative housing, communal housing, collective housing and 
commune, may be considered here (Vestbro and Horelli, 2012). Concerning the 
formation of the community, an increasing number of people appear to be wanting to 
escape solo home ownership and individual responsibility in bland suburbs (e.g., having 
to pay an expensive mortgage because of a bad credit score); instead, they wish to try 
living in a higher density, more eco-friendly environment where social interaction with 
neighbours is better and where more collective or collaborative decision-making 
processes occur. The community movement of co-housing values, particularly those 
around building together, sharing everyday life and serving a common ideal, began in 
other countries (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Russia, America, Australia) from the late 19th century onwards. These values have 
spread to the UK, as more people wish to live in different types of mixed-tenure and 
mixed-ownership developments and are shunning traditional, neo-liberal economic 
models of homemaking. 
 
The preservation of co-housing communities is on the increase, in tandem with their 
growth in formation. Co-housing developments are gaining favour across the UK, with 
over 60 communities established or developing, and countless more being formed. 
Creating and maintaining social bonds and living less expensive lifestyles act as strong 
reasons to stay within this community, especially compared with increased loneliness 
and isolation and higher costs of living experienced in cities. The rise in ‘co-housing 
consultants’, found mostly in America, help to educate people on the benefits of co-
housing lifestyles. However, the dissolution of this type of community is also evident. 
Maintaining group solidarity, creating a shared vision, developing group decision-making 
processes etc., may be difficult for some individuals and groups to enact on a daily 
basis, with between 70-90% of co-housing developments not achieving their goals. 
People may retreat to their nuclear families and more traditional ways of living when 
things do not work out as planned. 
 
 
Example 8: Diversity in relation to security and control of a 
community 
The challenges and risks for security relating to diversity are principally connected to 
major differences between communities and values. The increased threat of acts of 
terrorism and the networks behind them raises serious issues for ensuring and 
maintaining security. This has seen a series of events whereby the diversity of nations, 
including the UK, has been depicted as problematic despite the lack of strong evidence 
to support some of the claims made. Within this threat are different communities of belief 
whose values seek to severely disrupt the operations and values of the communities of 
others. The situation is further complicated by the transfer of individuals or groups from 
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one community to another through conversion of their beliefs, via a process of 
radicalisation. The tensions caused by such actions raises key concerns regarding the 
diversity of populations since it is perceived, if not fully understood how, they foster 
radical values and their respective communities. The 2017 report by the National 
Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, states that the "threat from 
terrorism is likely to expand as the ability of states, groups and individuals to impose 
harm diversifies. The net effect of rising tensions within and between countries—and the 
growing threat from terrorism—will be greater global disorder and considerable 
questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international 
system" (p.32).  
In terms of the formation of communities in relation to diversity, it is likely that the 
increased awareness and expectations of the public in a highly interconnected world will 
challenge prevailing assumptions about governance and security. The diminishing 
capacity of national governments to provide and sustain effective governance has led to 
the transfer of governance to local bodies, businesses, advocacy groups and the third 
sector, especially where they are more agile in delivering services and thus garner 
support from populations for their agendas. What is less clear at this point is whether the 
redistribution of services will lead to a fragmentation of resources and greater inequality. 
The formation of new communities concerned with security will present a new challenge 
to governments and societies as to how to effectively combine them whilst ensuring 
overall safety and security of the nation is not compromised. The movement of power 
from established nations to rising and developing countries but also towards non-state 
actors. These non-state actors may be agents or spoilers of cooperation. A wide range 
of transnational communities have been equally, if not more, effective than states at 
reframing issues and mobilising public opinion for the better including: NGOs, civil-
society groups, faith-based organisations, corporations, and other interest groups. 
However, hostile non-state actors for example terrorist networks and criminal 
organisations, all empowered by existing and new technologies (e.g. the Dark Web), 
present serious security threats and may further compound systemic risks. 
Concerning the preservation of community values, the shift to a 'multipolar' world 
(EUISS, 2010), is adding complexity to the process of effective global governance. The 
growing economic influence of emerging powers increases their ability to exert political 
effects far beyond their geographic boundaries. Increasing diverse perspectives on, and 
suspicions about, global governance processes of internationalisation which are typically 
seen as Western concepts, will further contribute to the difficulties of effectively 
preserving the security of current values and responding to the increasing number of 
challenges to them. Rising tensions within and between countries coupled with the 
slowing down of the global economy will contribute to the increasingly complex 
challenges facing the world and its communities, leading to significant disruption, 
reformulation or, indeed, dissolution of them. The potential dissolution of existing orders 
due to the growing range of states, organisations, and empowered individuals who 
shape geopolitics will cause considerable uncertainty. The emerging global landscape is 
evidently entering a new era beyond the Cold War that dominated the communities and 
values concerning security for the latter half of the 20th century. 
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Example 9: Urbanisation in relation to different states and core 
characteristics of a community 
 
The role of the built environment as the primary habitat for humankind in the 21st century 
is crucial to understanding the various issues around the future of communities and 
values. Cities and other urbanised areas play a fundamental part in how people meet 
and share their interests and values. They also engender competitiveness for resources 
and for different values to be recognised. This leads to the formation, movement, 
preservation and dissolution of a wide range of communities with specific interests. The 
processes of urbanisation bring with them a complex confluence of issues that underpin 
many of the other themes examined in this report. Despite various attempts to imagine 
different ways of designing and living in our cities (Dunn et al., 2014) we have yet to 
conceive of any practical and sustainable method to construct large scale environments 
for ourselves. Cities often harbour many communities since they are typically places of 
contestation, tension, difference, and resistance. As such, individuals may form or join a 
community to preserve or relocate their shared values with like-minded others. In this 
example, the theme of urbanisation will be used to demonstrate the interconnections 
between various states of communities and the different characteristics of them. 
 
In relation to community formation and access, by 2050, the proportion of people living 
in urban areas is likely to have increased from slightly more then 50% to approximately 
70% of the world's population (OECD, 2012). Of the 23 cities expected to have 
populations of ten million or more inhabitants by 2015, 19 are likely to be in developing 
countries. The exposure to new ideas and accessibility of goods and services that urban 
inhabitants may experience will have a range of effects. It may provide a catalyst for 
formation and movement of some communities via civil activism, particularly where 
inequality is evident, and it may lead to a better quality of life for a large number of 
people. This latter aspect of urbanisation directly correlates to the values people hold 
and share and how they may evolve. Through their access to a higher standard of living, 
individuals and groups may build communities to maintain their values and interests, and 
to protect certain lifestyles or the choices of them. Clearly, such lifestyles vary 
considerably across different urban areas around the globe, from basic human rights of 
potable drinking water and sanitation to the accessibility and provision of more extensive 
resources that enable human life to flourish. 
 
Concerning the relationship between community movement and place, the greatest 
increases in urbanisation are likely to be in Asia, with between 250 and 300 million 
people likely to move from rural to urban areas over the next 15 years in China alone. 
Cities are typically a nexus of competing communities and values so this overall 
movement toward urban areas will see the movement of existing communities but with, 
or in relation to, newly formed aspirations, alongside the reconfiguration or emergence of 
communities whose values are directly influenced by their new habitat. 
 
With regard community preservation and power, governments will increasingly need 
policies and processes for enabling public-private partnerships with a wide variety of 
urban actors including: city leaders, NGOs, and civil societies, to address emerging 
challenges. The role of multinational corporations and charitable foundations in 
supporting the work of governments is likely to increase particularly in the provision of 
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education, healthcare, information service, and research to societies. Although states 
will continue to be the primary providers of national security and other elements of 'hard 
power', their capacity to leverage communities of local, private, and transnational 
members would augment their 'soft power'. Decentralised governance combined with 
liberal forms of democracy will best support these partnerships between public-private 
and local-national-transnational. New forms of governance, with varying degrees of self-
organisation and collective decision making will be fostered by technologies in some 
societies. However, other governments may not be able to or have the desire to provide 
the infrastructure and access to such technologies, leading to a range of outcomes such 
as increased authoritarianism or state failure. 
 
Community dissolution and security when examined through the challenge of 
urbanisation indicate a number of risks. Processes of rapid urbanisation, often uneven 
across different territories, couple with substantial inequality amongst populations are 
likely to increase the probability of social unrest as a direct consequence of the 
conditions of their built environment, such as densely inhabited slum areas. The 
concentration of populations afforded by urbanisation makes them efficient in many 
ways. However, it also makes them susceptible to the effects of natural disasters, 
disease and deliberate acts of violence. Due to the large number of urban areas in 
coastal regions, cities are also likely to be especially vulnerable to the effects of rising 
sea levels. The issues surrounding cities that fail or are failing, in both developed and 
developing countries, could pose major security challenges (for example: social unrest 
and even insurgencies) with the potential for nation-wide repercussions that may breach 
national borders. If, as projected, an increased number of people live in urban areas, 
security and armed forces will almost certainly need to operate in this environment to a 
greater extent. Adversaries could range from government-controlled militaries to armed 
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Speculative mode: alternative futures 
 
Future scenarios are valuable in their ability to offer challenging, plausible and relevant 
depictions that illustrate how the future may unfold (Hunt et al., 2012). For this report, we 
will employ the structure first proposed by the Global Scenario Group (GSG, 1995) which 
consists of three world types: Business as Usual; Barbarisation; and Great Transitions. 
Each of these world types in subsequently examined through two distinct scenarios i.e. 
Policy Reform and Market Forces; Breakdown and Fortress World; Eco-Communalism 
and New Sustainability Paradigm. The intention of these scenarios is to facilitate a 
deeper understanding of the key fundamental drivers that could bring about realistic 
world changes. By presenting scenario archetypes that are sufficiently distinct, the aim is 
examine radical yet plausible alternatives alongside those futures we currently view as 
probable. In the context of this paper we have provided brief overviews of Business as 
Usual: Market Forces, and Barbarisation: Fortress World so that their general relevance 
to security, risks and threats may be garnered. We have then provided a more in depth 
look at how a further scenario, Great Transitions: New Sustainability Paradigm, can be 
used as a critical lens to examine specific challenges to society in relation to different 
states of communities and core characteristics of them i.e. power (organisation) and 
housing; Dissolution and Health and wellbeing; and Migration and Movement. This has 
been conducted to illustrate how the framework of states and core characteristics of 
communities can be used to examine specific relationships whilst providing a systematic 
way of supporting the speculative mode of inquiry for further comparative analysis 
across all challenges to society, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
Business as Usual - Scenario 1: Market Forces 
 
In the Market Forces scenario, the developmental patterns are driven by multi-scalar 
forces of economics that influence the availability of goods and the demand for them. 
Whilst this is sometimes closely coupled to government agendas in terms of policy 
based around productivity and economic resilience, it typically operates outside of any 
control or support by governments. Whilst the trends of market forces have tended to 
shape the world gradually, the nature of their indexing to potentially volatile shifts rather 
than normative fluctuations means that going forward their future may be much more 
reflective of an uncertain world with regard both resources and security in the widest 
sense. 
 
The potential impact on communities is that they are witness to the various pushes and 
pulls of uncontrolled urbanisation and increasing ageing populations, within a 
consumerist world where those with wealth, however this is measured relative to 
context, gain further wealth. With the focus on economic efficiency, low levels of 
government intervention may lead to faster environmental degradation as key factors 
such as: CO2 emissions, deforestation, pollutants, resource depletion, and water stress 
all significantly increase. The further influence of such weak policies results in poor 
social environments and policies, the latter largely being responsive rather than 
preventative and proactive. 
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In terms of the context for communities, development and planning policies follow the 
market, and are therefore reactionary and unable to control patterns of urban growth and 
the resultant impact on infrastructures and quality of life. There is significant net change 
in the land occupied by the built environment; where density and/or sprawl are rampant 
as the logics of the market dictate. Worse, this further increases the number of ghost 
developments: neighbourhoods, zones, even entire cities where no one actually lives but 
are simply part of an investment portfolio. Quality of life across communities varies 
considerably depending on geographic location and its position as beneficiary within the 
markets and their effects. 
 
Barbarisation - Scenario 2: Fortress World 
 
In the Fortress World scenario, the world is organised by authoritarian rule where elites 
control an impoverished majority and manage critical natural resources from protected 
enclaves. In this future, wealth, resources and conventional governance systems are 
eroding and alliances are made to protect the privileges of the rich and powerful. This 
leads to the military control, which is also increasingly privatised, of strategic resources 
including freshwater and minerals alongside other important biological resources. 
Geographic boundaries are redrawn and skewed due to the preemptive and defensive 
practices of offshoring to preserve the lifestyle and security of the elites, which directly 
correlates to exclusion zones and territories for the poor.  
 
These deepening social and environmental tensions are unresolved and become more 
pronounced, bringing forth many unwelcome social changes and great human misery. 
Security and defensibility are the primary values driving actions across all communities, 
though separate spheres of the elites and the masses as codified in legal and 
institutional frameworks ensures only a global minority have secure lifestyles. The world 
thus divides into a form of global apartheid between those inside the fortresses and 
those outside of them. A gradual decline in human health means that overall life 
expectancies are lower than today. 
 
Planning policies serve to reinforce the power geometry between the rich from the 
poor. The built environment sprawls to cover twice its current land cover, in part to meet 
the demands of population growth higher than today; and agricultural land use increases 
substantially at the expense of natural forest. High urbanisation combined with 
population growth leads to more people in urban areas, but densities manifest differently 
for the rich and the poor. Land recycling is probably lower overall, although it may be 
higher within the enclaves. The impoverished majority live in poor environmental 
conditions, with low engagement and low satisfaction as their values are principally 




Great Transitions - Scenario 2: New Sustainability Paradigm 
 
In the New Sustainability Paradigm scenario, new socio-economic arrangements and 
fundamental changes in values result in changes to the character of urban industrial 
civilisation. The search for a deeper basis for human happiness and fulfilment is a 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s (DCDC) Global Strategic Trends Programme 
 
 29 
central theme for human development. Civil society and engaged citizens become 
critical sources of change for the new values: an ethos of ‘one planet living’ (including 
reducing, re-using, and recycling) facilitates a shared vision for more sustainable living 
and a much improved quality of life.  
 
A new form of globalisation changes the character of industrial society; the role of 
business is transformed through the integration of sustainable development as a 
business opportunity and a matter of social responsibility. Labour-intensive craft 
economy rises alongside the high-tech base. Integrated settlement patterns place home, 
work, shops, and leisure activity in closer proximity.   
 
Planning policies are highly regulated, emphasising ecological imperatives, regional 
planning and sustainability. There is no net change in the land occupied by the ‘built 
environment’; sprawl is contained. Dwelling density is roughly what it is today on the city 
scale, because of higher brownfield regeneration than today and integrated settlement 
patterns; however lower population growth and less migration to cities allows for town-
within-a-city development, leaving more open space within the cities. The shift to values 
emphasising quality of life, human solidarity and environmental sustainability supports 
much greater civic participation; local area satisfaction is much higher than today as is 
quality of housing and local environmental quality. Life expectancy is higher and 
employment rates are much higher than today. In relation these fundamental tenets of 
the New Sustainability Paradigm, it is possible to explore their implications across 
different community states and challenges to society as illustrated in tables 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
Table 1. Power (organisation) and housing: Co-housing 





widely adopted in 
planning policy as a 
way of fostering 
human solidarity and 
environmental 
sustainability, larger 
numbers of people in 
new types of 
formations (e.g., 
multi-generational 
families of different 
ethnic backgrounds) 
are coming together 
to live and share 
domestic duties and 
responsibilities. 
The co-housing 
idea begins initially 
in more rural areas 
and outer urban 
fringes, and 
migrates to city 
centres, as new 
generations of 
urban dwellers take 
advantage of the 






connections. As a 
result, new 
architectural forms 
are created that 
meld old buildings 
and spaces into 
collective spaces for 
everyone to use 
and enjoy. 
Due to high levels 
of civic 
participation and 
the emphasis on 
sustainability, co-
housing boards are 




housing ideals and 
try to make it 
easier for others to 




ideals to work and 





on how to create 
and maintain co-
housing, they are 
also quite open to 
groups governing 
co-housing sites in 
their own way. In 
this sense, they 
are dissolving 
traditional notions 




















Habits and behaviours that are considered damaging to the health of people and the 
planet are discouraged through the development of integrated health teams, based 
within communities and/or co-housing sites. The teams include a ‘sustainability 
facilitator’ who works with health and social care professionals, friends and family and 
relevant others to get rid of bad habits and behaviours, and instil more fulfilling and 
worthwhile attitudes and ideas. 
Place 
(boundaries) 
More ‘towns-within-city’ developments take shape, freeing up green spaces within cities 
for people to be active and healthy, and to practice mindfulness. The trend to bring more 
green (e.g., parks) and blue (e.g., canals) spaces into towns, co-housing developments 
and cities, generally, continues, helping to blur the boundaries between nature and the 




Co-housing boards, integrated health teams and other decision-making bodies work 
together to force out organisations and companies in their cities and regions that pedal 
‘quick-fix’ health medicines and remedies to vulnerable groups (e.g., older people). New 
health and wellbeing manifestos are currently being drawn up that would give such 




Due to people adopting more sustainable living patterns, their quality of life and mental 
health increases, and they feel much safer in their developments, towns, cities and 
regions. As a result, security firms that once patrolled neighbourhoods to prevent crime 
are disbanded and employees are re-trained to become part of integrated health teams. 
 




New migrants to countries are welcomed with open arms by indigenous and existing 
communities, particularly those who wish to practice craft-based or high-tech work. Most 
settle in towns, rather than cities, as they prefer a village-type feel where they can learn 




Once established, most migrants choose to stay where they are so they can become 
rooted in their communities and highly-integrated settlements. Those who do decide to 
move around can do so freely and without prejudice, as countries strive to become 
boundary-less and work together to promote sustainable lifestyles. 
Power 
(organisation) 
Upon entering new countries, migrants are immediately given full rights (e.g., to vote, to 
hold office, to co-own property) and are treated like indigenous and existing 
communities. As such, they are expected to uphold ‘one planet living’ principles and 
enact them daily. They also have a strong say and choice over the delivery of services 
that affect them (e.g., health and social care). 
Security 
(control) 
Migration numbers are not capped anywhere, globally, as individual and collective 
quality of life is supported over and above a country’s ability to ‘take someone in’. 
Funding and other resources are available from international organisations, both public 
and private, to help countries and communities care for those who wish, or have, to 
immigrate (as well as providing funding for the migrants, themselves). Emphasis is 
placed on making the migration journey as painless and as socially, economically and 
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Analytical mode: underlying changes informing risks and threats 
 
In the process of researching this report and examining the future of community and 
values out to 2050, we found a number of sources that present potentially significant 
underlying changes to this future. These may be best understood as directly responding 
to the questions of who the communities of the future will be and how this will influence 
their values. We believe the evidence provided in this section signals important shifts 
that underpin the nature of what communities we will seek to form or join along with how 
and why they will be reflective of our changing values. Therefore, in this section we will 
examine the following interrelated aspects: who we will be, what we will do, and why we 
do it. These subsections enable us to assess patterns and trends in evidence currently 
available and unpack their specific implications for the future.  
 
 
Who we will be 
 
1. Decline and delay in family formation 
One of the central tenets of many communities around the globe is the formation of 
family structures, the nature of which typically instils a set of values. These values are 
either reinforced, revised or rejected depending on their characteristics and wider 
societal implications, usually through a process of calibration via contact with those both 
within and outside of the immediate family group. Yet, there is significant evidence that 
family formation is either being delayed or declined in many countries (Jacobsen and 
Mather, 2011; Wang, 2017). Two reports by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Doing Better for Families (2011a) and The Future of Families to 2030 
(2011b) indicate that one-person households and single-parent families set to increase 
alongside a continuation and even acceleration of transformations in household and 
family structures. Bernheimer and ADAM (2014) contrast this view with regard the U.K. 
context, suggesting that solo living has stagnated and shared housing is on the 
increase. This is partly due to difficulties in entering the housing market for younger 
generations but also because of the growth in unrelated adults sharing households due 
to economic necessity, family fragmentation, or other socioeconomic factors including 
work.  
 
These changes will directly inform the spatial mobility patterns of households and 
families since it will play an increasingly pivotal role for family cohesion and thus have 
implications for transport services and infrastructures. Such shifts are also likely to result 
on more mobility (OECD, 2011a) as more single-person households, increase in divorce 
rates and reconfigured families, growing proportion of elderly people including rural and 
suburban areas, all suggest longer distances amongst family members. High levels of 
commuting and transportation between different households will be necessary for those 
providing and receiving care i.e. spouses, partners, children and grandparents. 
Vulnerabilities in services and infrastructures apparent in rural and some suburban 
areas are likely to increase considerably without substantial investment, thereby 
reinforcing private car use, if not ownership, further.  
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The OECD (2011b) also present some important changes to families notably that most 
countries have witnessed a decline in fertility rate over the last three decades, with 
almost no OECD country having a total fertility rate above the population replacement 
rate (two children per women). The consequence of this is that the average household 
size has also decreased across the same period. This may correlate to the sharp 
increase in the proportion of women entering the labour force, however, larger gender 
gaps in employment and earnings remain, with attendant impacts on child wellbeing 
such as one in eight children on average across the OECD living in relative poverty. 
Concerning family formation patterns, the is a continuing increase in both men and 
women wanting to establish themselves in the labour market prior to forming a family. 
This is resulting in two distinct trends. Firstly, an increase in the age of mothers at first 
childbirth, and secondly, there has been and continues to be, a rise in the probability of 
women having fewer children than previous generations. It should also be noted that 
many women remain childless. The fall in birth rates and increase in life expectancy, 
there are now fewer children and more grandparents than before, a trend set to 
continue. 
 
2. Rise in individualism  
The second important factor in determining who will form and sustain the communities of 
the future is the rise in individualism. Santos, Varnum and Grossmann (2017) have 
illustrated that individualistic practices and values are increasing around the world. 
Whilst a considerable amount of the research on the development of rising individualism 
has focused on the United States, their findings illustrate a pattern that applies to other 
countries that are not industrialised or Western. This trend seems set to continue with 
the data indicating that overall, the majority of countries are shifting toward greater 
individualism. The primary driver appears to be socioeconomic development, with those 
countries that do not illustrate an increase in individualist values correlating to those 
where socioeconomic development was the lowest across the period examined. It can 
be seen that the rise in individualism is rapidly transforming those countries and their 
cultures with traditionally long-held beliefs and values for example in China (Zou and 
Cai, 2016) and India (Dasguptal, 2017). However, as Douthat (2014) has observed, it 
remains to be seen whether this level of individualism regardless of how it may be 
currently understood or defined e.g. disaffiliated, post-familial, post-patriotic etc., is 
sustainable across the life cycle and can form a culture's dominant way of life. 
 
3. Increase in individual empowerment 
Closely coupled to the rise in individualism is an increase in individual empowerment. 
Reports by RAND (2015) and ESPAS (2015) demonstrate that. 
One of the difficulties in this issue lies in comprehending the concept of individual 
empowerment for which there is no universally accepted definition. For example EUISS 
(2012) considers individual empowerment to be directly related to social and 
technological progress, whilst the World Bank (2013) focuses its definition on access to 
information, inclusion and participation, accountability and local organisational capacity. 
Technological advancements and, particularly, the rise of social media over the past 
decade have significantly altered the way in which people report and absorb information 
(Beckett and Mansell, 2008). People have increasing access to information via the 
internet and grow in connectivity across the globe. Traditional media outlets remain but 
social media is enabling people to enter into a direct exchange of information, and that in 
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place of the previous practice individual consumption is one increasingly based in a 
collective sharing process (Beckett and Fenyoe, 2012). As a result of this trend, 
information technologies have come to be an indispensable tool for those looking to 
influence people in innovative ways and to coordinate individuals on a very large scale 
(Norris, 2006; Williams, 2008). Furthermore, this increase in individual empowerment 
does not necessarily correlate with a growth in democracy (Carothers, 2015). Jang et al. 
(2016) make it clear that individual empowerment will disrupt the state of global 
governance through its interconnections with an increasing awareness of human 
security, institutional complexity, international power shifts and the liberal world political 
paradigm 
 
What we will do 
 
1. Greater division in how and where we live 
The emergence and rapid spread of gated communities in urban, suburban and rural 
areas around the world over the past thirty years has been associated with the desire to 
create a sense of prestige and exclusiveness alongside the search for multiple, often 
non-essential amenities, like tennis courts and spas (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; 
Csefalvay, 2011; Low, 2001; Manzi and Smith-Bowers, 2005; Woods, 2016). One of the 
biggest explanations for moving into a gated community from other neighbourhoods, 
though, relates to a perceived reduction in crime, fear of crime and violence. In their 
study of gated communities in Orange County in California, Branic and Kubrin (2017) 
confirm this hypothesis, finding that the presence of gated communities corresponded to 
a 22% decrease in expected violent crimes and a 17% decrement in expected property 
crimes. These findings are consistent with other scholars (e.g., Addington and Rennison, 
2013), suggesting that the trend of moving into gated communities for safety reasons 
continues to occur. 
 
Another reason to move into a gated community may relate to age. Rosenberg and 
Wilson (2018) suggest a trend towards more purpose-built communities for older people, 
including gated communities and ageing resource communities. These types of 
communities reflect a wider social movement around the creation of ‘age-friendly’ 
communities in which places are designed with, and for, older people and their needs 
(WHO, 2007). Somewhat paradoxically, however, this trend has generated debate about 
the value of such communities, as they have the legislative ability to segregate people 
according to age; thus, children and even some working age adults could be excluded 
from living there if they are below a certain threshold age (see McHugh et al., 2002). 
 
Much Anglo-American academic scholarship has demonstrated the relative homogeneity 
of suburbs in terms of social class, with the arrival of gated communities in these areas 
resulting in further homogeneity. Such sameness is preferred because ‘everyone looks 
and seems the same… [and] there would be no need to accommodate differences (Low 
et al., 2012, p. 288). In many Latin American countries, including Argentina, however, 
the presence of gated communities has led to social transformation (Roitman, 2017). 
Whereas Argentinian suburbs traditionally have been the domain of poorer residents, 
the emergence of gated communities has led to greater heterogeneity between poor and 
affluent people. Nonetheless, the increasing trend toward gated communities in 
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suburban areas also has meant stronger segregation processes and more visible, socio-
spatial inequalities (Roitman and Giglio, 2010). 
 
While segregation between gated communities and surrounding areas is not a new 
trend, new research suggests that internal divisions within gated communities can exist 
and may cause problems (Charney and Palgi, 2018). Exploring kibbutzim in Israel, the 
authors found that residents experienced social, economic and power stratifications, 
which had an impact on decision-making powers and rights. This confirms Grant and 
Middlesteadt’s (2004) statement that, ‘mixing rarely occurs in gated projects’ (p. 924) 
and, as such, is a trend worth exploring in more detail. 
 
Recent research from Australia has found that master planned, residential estate 
developments – in particular, gated communities – have flourished in outer suburbs and 
in areas of high deprivation, resulting in enclosed enclaves of comparative wealth 
(Kenna et al., 2017). Due to the restrictive covenants associated with these gated 
communities, changes to their physical fabric often are limited to a prescribed set of 
alterations that residents can make (e.g., changing roof tiles from a pre-approved list of 
roof tile colours and materials). As a result, these covenants can put gated communities 
beyond the reach of broader planning policies for cities and/or the country, including 
densification, environmental sustainability and climate change. With the growing trend 
toward more gated communities, local and national governments will need to think 
carefully about how to work with the restrictive covenants within these communities in 
order to achieve broader sustainability and climate change targets. 
 
Not all gated communities refuse to change their practices. In Bangalore, India, 
residents of some gated communities are taking a community leadership role and are 
pushing for more efficient waste and water management (Ganguly and Lutringer, 2017). 
National and local laws on waste segregation, coupled with strong leadership within the 
communities (mostly from women and from those who have spent time in the US and 
Europe), has meant that community leaders can mobilise support around water and 
waste management as well as lobby external actors and organisations to establish more 
effective systems for the gated communities. This activism also has spilled over into 
other issues within the gated communities and beyond (e.g., some leaders are now 
environmental activists for the city-at-large).   
 
2. Shifting patterns in our consumption and behaviour 
Traditional business is undergoing huge changes as markets and products become 
increasingly complex. The influence of an ageing population that may not necessarily be 
familiar or even find itself challenged by the pace of new products is also informing a 
new form of consumerism amidst increasing amounts of information and competition 
(Rosebaum, 2015). However, within these shifts is a core trend of empowering the 
consumer to articulate preferences explicitly, which is allowing businesses to better 
understand consumer behaviours and the products and services they require (ICF GHK, 
2012). In theory this leads to increased consumer strength as a result of better and 
cheaper products and services, which are supplied with greater efficiency due to 
increased competition. However, there are disruptive trends that do not readily conform 
to this model, most notably that younger generations are prioritising the ownership of 
material goods such as cars and homes less and less in favour of personal experiences 
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(Saiidi, 2016). This trend has been instrumental in fuelling the growth of major disruptors 
to traditional business mechanisms such as Airbnb, Uber and WeWork. Notwithstanding 
this trend, the increased blurring between consumer and producer is bringing forward 
innovation and new business models as the barriers between modes of production and 
consumption are disappearing, allowing consumers to be directly and personally 
involved in the making of bespoke goods or services due to mass-customisation 
manufacturing techniques and consumer-driven markets.  
 
3. Transformations in the nature of our work and workplace 
Changes to the nature and destination of our work will result in significant implications 
for our daily routine, relationships and movements (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2017). As 
Bernheimer and ADAM (2014) suggest, there is likely to be a continuing declining in 
commuting and dormitory suburbs will drastically disappear.	Homeworking employees 
are currently the fastest growing workforce segment and with the shifts in family 
formation patterns along with precarious forms of work increasing is a trend that will 
endure. Millennials will spend more time where they live, in theory leading to stronger 
local communities grouped around local services like cafés, crèches and shared office 
facilities.	However, this will depend on the types of work contract they have and the time 
frame within which they do it, which is significantly shifting from the traditional 9-5 
timespan. 
 
The rise of the 'ageless' workplace (Unum, 2014) is largely being driven by the shift to a 
top-heavy demographic in the Western world i.e. as discussed above both a reduction in 
birth rates and an increase in life expectancy. In the U.K. Baby Boomers represent 25% 
of the population and are living longer, whilst in the wider context of OECD countries life 
expectancy has risen to 80 years. This trend results in a disruption of age in the 
workplace that creates challenges, such as younger workers managing older 
colleagues, which at present is not a typical situation. Furthermore, as the working 
population's average age increases it is likely to be paralleled by negative consequences 
borne of juggling career, family, friends, etc. suggesting a lack of appetite to work in later 
stages of life. The compound effect of this is higher levels of stress, and an increased 
probability of people leaving their job. 
 
In its 2014 report, The Future of Work: Jobs and Skills in 2030, the UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills outlined four key trends that will impact the nature of our work 
and workplace. These are: emerging economies acquiring stronger representation in 
global production chains; demographic change and migration changing the face of the 
workforce; technological developments slowly dissolving the boundaries between 
sectors and are changing traditional modes of working; and organisational structures in 
business are evolving and becoming more flexible and more networked.  
 
 
Why we will do it 
 
1. Trust in authority 
There is a significant and continual decline in trust concerning mainstream institutions of 
all kinds from business to governments, and the media to NGOs. Bowman (2017) 
reports that two-thirds of countries have fallen into what the Edelman Trust Barometer 
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labels “distruster” territory, where trust levels have sunk below 50% (Edelman, 2017). 
Edelman (2017) also provide evidence of a leadership credibility crisis, with just 37% of 
people now viewing CEOs as credible and 29% feeling the same about government 
officials. Perhaps unsurprisingly, of the four institutions measured, it is the media that 
has seen the biggest decline in trust among the public. It is distrusted in 83% of 
countries (less than 50% of people trust it); and in only five – Singapore, China India, 
Indonesia, and the Netherlands – does trust exceed 50%. What perhaps is revealing 
and less expected is that, for the first time, there has been a decline in public trust of 
NGOs. In the US, China, Japan, Germany and the UK, trust in NGOs fell below 50%. In 
the social media era, in which ‘fake news’ has become a buzz term, it is perhaps not 
surprising that more people have lost faith in the mainstream media. Instead, they 
increasingly trust their peers, “people like themselves”, as sources of information. This 
clearly has implications and has been the subject of much debate of how public policy 
can better serve the general public (OECD, 2017). The echo-chamber phenomenon, in 
which a belief becomes objective truth because it is repeated within groups of like-
minded people, has been widely observed. What is more surprising, however, is the fact 
that people’s peers are now seen as being as credible as those regarded as experts. In 
the European Union, recent referendum results and shifts toward populism have caused 
major disruptions to previous, and relatively stable patterns and trends (Algan et al., 
2017). This results in a radical shift of who we trust and why. 
 
2. Changes and trends in what people value 
The first two decades of the 21st century have been turbulent in terms of culture, political 
unrest, and economic uncertainty. With the advent of new words, new interests and new 
references, our daily attitudes and lifestyles have changed significantly, reflecting shifts 
in what we value. Sportoletti (2017) suggests these changes belie how we view 
ourselves and how the choices we make reflect our identity. In particular, he identifies 
ten key influences on our evolving values: wellness, authenticity, digitalisation, customer 
care responsibility, customisation, living together but not mixing well, privacy and safety, 
ageing, East more than West, and sustainability. However, the situation is further 
complicated by patterns of value focus that question previously reliable assumptions 
based on demographics. As Thompson (2017) has reported, in the U.S. it is not the 
younger generations at the vanguard of non-monetary values and gig-style jobs but the 
oldest. 	
 
3. Control of attitudes and behaviours 
How governments seek to inform the behaviours of their populations is a topic that has 
been increasingly important on policy agendas due to concerns of security, health and 
wellbeing, and environmental impact. Ipsos MORI (2012) conducted a major analysis on 
public opinion on behaviour change policy with several relevant outcomes for the context 
of this paper. Firstly, there are large national differences, for example a considerably 
higher acceptability of state intervention on behaviour in countries such as India and 
China than in wealthy North European nations – from Sweden to the UK – and the U.S.’s 
wariness in particular of intervening. The high overall level of public support for action – 
and especially for more transparent information and various ‘nudges’ indicates an 
increased collective responsibility to oneself and each other. This leads to the second 
key finding, that in some countries on particular issues, for example unhealthy food and 
its correlation to NCDs, the public seem to be supportive of harder measures than many  
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policymakers have previously believed. Globally, there is a significant range of support 
for legislation which perhaps comes as no surprise given the different values and types 
of community across the geopolitical spectrum. For example, support for partially-
restrictive interventions i.e. those that seek to change a behaviour through making it 
more expensive or difficult drops from an average across policy areas of 88% in China 
to 46% in the U.S. Outright prohibitions divide global opinion even more, with 87% 
average support in Saudi Arabia and India but only 33% in the U.S. Thirdly, the more 
prosperous a country is (as measured by GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing 
power), the less likely its public are to support behaviour change interventions. Yet 
within countries themselves, wealthier individuals tend to be more supportive of each 
level of behavioural intervention than those with lower incomes. Although many people 
may practice an undesirable behaviour, this does not directly correlate with low support 
for interventions against this behaviour. The effect of prevalence on support of 
intervention appears to be both issue- and country-dependent, forming a complex 


































The final section of this report provides synthesis of our findings and a summary 
regarding the diversity of possible futures in order to draw suitable conclusions in 
relation to overarching narratives and thematic patterns for how community and values 
in 2050 may evolve. From the outset, we identified that the subjects under study i.e. 
'community' and 'values' are both highly complex and interrelated but do not readily 
conform to analyses seeking correlation or causality. Because of this complexity in 
approaching the subjects, we set out to design and develop a novel way of examining 
key trends and patterns through three stages. First, we introduced a matrix to enable us 
to identify examples of communities across their different states (i.e. formation, 
movement, preservation, dissolution) in relation to core characteristics of communities 
(i.e. access, place, power, security). Secondly, we drew upon a wide range of different 
examples of communities to populate this matrix to illustrate the complex 
interrelationships of the different types, their values, and scale of influence. Thirdly, 
having considered these examples through business as usual situations, we then looked 
ahead using a speculative mode to explore alternatives futures based on the evidence 
collected to understand the challenges, barriers, risks and threats that may face the 
future of communities and values out to 2050. These three scenarios were depicted in 
order to explain the way events might unfold and in doing so, further our understanding 
as to what guidance and actions may be needed to direct us toward a future that is 
desirable. Fourthly, we then used an analytical mode to examine evidence that enables 
assessment of the underlying changes informing risks and threats (i.e. who we are, what 
we will do, why we will do it). Finally, we will compare these two modes to understand 
how the future of community and values might change over the next 30 years.  
 
We fully acknowledge the limitations of the matrix presented since it is deliberately 
flexible and open to interpretation. However, we believe it makes a valuable contribution 
and enabled us to circumvent some of the problems and pitfalls that are intrinsic to 
futures research as identified in an early section of the paper. In terms of the speculative 
mode, the use of a particular scenario as a critical lens to examine specific challenges to 
society in relation to different states of communities and core characteristics of them was 
instrumental in demonstrating how our conceptual framework can be used to examine 
specific relationships whilst providing a systematic method of exploring alternative 
futures. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be useful to conduct this 
for each challenge to society to enable comparative analysis of intersecting themes, and 
gain deeper insights into potential correlations and causality. With regard the analytical 
mode, we were able to identify important shifts that underpin the nature of what 
communities we will seek to form or join along with how and why they will be reflective of 
our changing values. Again, in a similar manner to the challenges to society, these are 
interrelated i.e. who we will be, what we will do, and why we will do it. In relation to who 
we will be in the future, there are three primary factors influencing identity and the 
communities we will associate with: decline and delay in family formation, a rise in 
individualism, and an increase in individual empowerment. Concerning what we will do 
in the future, the evidence surveyed provided three further factors that will determine our 
behaviours and relationships: greater division in how and where we live, shifting patterns 
in our consumption and behaviour, and transformations in the nature of our work and 
workplace. Why we will do certain things appears to cascade from who we will be and 
what we will do but is not hierarchical since this directly connects to our values which in 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s (DCDC) Global Strategic Trends Programme 
 
 39 
the future are also shaped by three factors: trust in authority, changes and trends in 
what people value, and control of attitudes and behaviours. The analytical mode allowed 
us to have an overview of the interconnected nature of community and values whilst also 
draw out key issues that will drive security measures against their associated risks and 
threats. To conclude, this paper has set out to better understand the future of community 
and values out to 2050. Whilst we believe we have contributed to this, we recognise that 
such a vast subject is difficult to examine in the scope of such a report and has 
necessarily led to the development of different methods of analysis and inquiry, which in 
turn has raised further questions that warrant exploration if a holistic evidence-based 
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